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The Future of Strategic Information and Cyber-Enabled
Information Operations
Abstract
To prepare for future challenges across the continuum of conflict, the United States (US)
must optimize how it manages, counters, defends, and exploits the effects of information by
organizing for strategic information and cyber-enabled information operations across and
through multiple domains. Currently, information related capabilities are fielded across the
United States Government (USG) among multiple organizations and agencies, and
therefore lack efficiencies normally gained through combined action, unity of command,
and unity of effort. In considering a solution to these challenges, this study examines
historic and current examples of successful information operations to show organization
matters, and reviews options to organize for future engagements. The methodology used to
conclude a new approach is necessary is patterned after a 1941 study on production
requirements for the US to enter World War II. This article similarly considers answers to
related questions, and shows the creation of an organization and the designation of a
senior official responsible for strategic information and cyber-enabled information
operations empowers the nation to integrate, synchronize, and harmonize activities
pursuant to a national and defense information strategy, thereby making the joint force
more lethal, and posturing the USG for dominance in the information environment.
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Introduction
Russian cyber-enabled influence and information operations have a
proven record of challenging United States and NATO interests. Over the
past few years, Russia has conducted a global influence campaign using
the Internet and social media assessed to be the most successful in
history.1 Russia refined its thinking on strategic influence in places like
Crimea and Georgia, where it had created a hybrid approach to
conventional warfare. Employing a whole of government effort, Russia
leverages its military and intelligence capabilities to conduct global
strategic influence operations, which includes the exploitation of online
media platforms, financial support to criminal organizations, and the use
of propaganda to shape international opinion and counter perceived
Western influence attempts.2 The Stockholm International Peace Research
project found Russia spent $61.4 billion on defense in 2018, which was
sixth in the world.3 Of their total budget, Russia dedicates an estimated
$400–$500 million annually on its foreign information efforts.4
A January 2018 U.S. Senate report chronicled Russian disinformation
efforts in 19 countries.5 Russia has focused operations not only against the
United States and NATO members, but also former Soviet States, and in
Syria, where it has integrated and synchronized its online activity with its
information campaign to project power and advance Putin’s political
goals.6 In the Brexit case alone, University of California at Berkeley
research identified 150,000 Twitter accounts with ties to Russia that
disseminated messages in favor of Britain leaving the European Union
(EU).7 Polling before the vote indicated a majority of British citizens
wished to remain a part of the EU; however, the final vote was closer, with
51.9 percent of the votes to leave with 48.1 percent voting to remain.8
Strategists anticipate that Russia will continue to evolve its information
capabilities to affect friendly, neutral, or hostile audiences.9 Hence, the
Brexit example clearly presage that Russia’s use of information will
continue to destabilize and weaken United States interests globally if
unchecked.
In addition to Russia, the threat from other foreign information operations
is increasing. Research published in the Washington Post cites Iran, Saudi
Arabia, China, Israel, Venezuela and others as employing influence
operations across borders to advance geopolitical goals.10 Former
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Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson identified information
operations as a rising threat that requires the Pentagon’s focus. “Our
adversaries are often better at shaping the perception of what's going on
than we are…Russia and China are better at that than we are because we
just don't think that way,” she said in May 2019.11
The effectiveness of a government’s information capabilities is a reflection
of how it is organized. The United States Government (USG) and DoD
oftentimes struggle to organize for information and cyber-enabled
information campaigns that would afford decision makers flexible options
to advance and defend political ideals. Frequently, the USG holds its vast
information capabilities in uncoordinated stovepipes, and misses potential
strategic advantages gained through combined action, unity of command,
and unity of effort.12 Russia has overcome these organizational barriers,
and according to RAND analyst Bruce McClintock, “The Russian
information operations system, combined with the Russian form of
centralized government control, allows it to launch cyber-operations with
greater speed, agility, and brazenness than most analysts believe is
possible in the West.”13
The United States must improve its ability to compete in the information
environment. The methodology used here to examine what improvements
are required follows a pattern of inquiries similar to those employed in
Major Albert Wedemeyer’s 1941 study to estimate production
requirements for the United States to enter World War II.14 His thinking
was in order to know how to organize for the future, he had to know what
missions the military would execute. Therefore, Maj Wedemeyer turned
his attention to understanding national policy, linking the strategic end
state to an estimate for increased military capacity. This article similarly
considers answers to a series of questions:
1. What is the national objective of the United States when it comes to
information operations and cyber-enabled information operations?
2. What strategy will accomplish the national objective?
3. What organizational construct is necessary to execute the strategy?
4. What resources are required to execute the strategy?
5. What is necessary to constitute, equip, and train those forces?
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The first two questions have answers in existing guidance. The national
objective for strategic information operations has the broad definition of
informing and shaping the perceptions of specific audiences in order to
gain or maintain a competitive advantage.15 The 2016 DoD Strategy for
Operations in the Information Environment provides a roadmap to
achieve the national objective.16
This article focuses on questions 3-5. In order to answer how the DoD
should organize for and execute strategic operations in the information
environment, a historical review is necessary. It will help frame the
problem and illuminate lessons that should apply towards preparing for
future approaches. To this end, this article will begin by discussing case
studies to provide an organizational framework for strategic influence. It
will then offer recommendations for an organizational construct to enable
the USG to win future information wars.

Organization Matters
History illustrates the value of an organized capability to conduct and
defend against strategic information operations. The British during World
War II established an organization for controlling the dissemination of
specific information to the Germans.17 The design of the British system
included centralized control of the strategic influence initiative focusing on
the employment of turned foreign agents and other human sources.
According to J.C. Masterman, the W. Board, comprised of Britain’s senior
leaders, specifically the three directors of intelligence, Chief of the Security
Service, and the head of the B. Division in M.I.5 (similar to the U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigations), oversaw the strategic direction of plans
and operations using agents as information pathways to deliver select
messages to desired recipients. Subordinate to the W. Board, the Twenty
Committee (XX Committee) oversaw the general day-to-day management
of the specific operations, and became the focal point for all information
transmitted to the enemy. Masterman stressed that the British successfully
used this system to integrate and synchronize information used to steer
German thinking and behavior in part because there was a section
dedicated to the special work.18 In other words, there was centralized
control of the system, but also decentralized execution through multiple
departments. Such a model highlights that a government’s ability to
engage in strategic information operations is most successful when there is
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an integrated organizational and operational construct, with access to
strategic levels of government, to manage influence operations conducted
across multiple agencies, departments, and domains.
Documents recovered from the archives of the Stasi secret police and East
Germany’s Politburo highlights a similar approach employed by the
Soviets during the Cold War.19 At the time, General Ivan Ivanovich
Agayants, the first director of the KGB Disinformation Department,
devised an information operation to suggest the resurgence of Nazism in
order to generate fear and distrust of West Germans.20 Soviet agents
painted swastikas and anti-Semitic slogans on synagogues and other
buildings in major cities worldwide. The global response was damaging to
West Germany. Some viewed the paintings as representative of a rising
tide of Nazism, and leading newspapers published articles along this
theme. It also marginalized West German diplomats. There were economic
impacts as storeowners removed German goods from stores and
supervisors fired German employees. Religious leaders viewed the antiSematic messages as “proof that the German nation had not overcome its
past.”21 In an act that suggested the potential fracturing of post-World War
II alliances, some questioned if West Germany could be trusted as a NATO
member. Author John Barron, in his book KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet
Secret Agents, wrote the practice of Russian disinformation and organized
deception is a “legacy of Lenin imbedded in Soviet custom,” and the use of
information operations remained an instrument consistent with Soviet
national policy.22 Therefore, information operations from the Russian
perspective remain calculated in a systematic approach to mislead,
confound, or inflame foreign opinion.
More recently, there have been isolated attempts within the U.S. Defense
Department to posture organizational resources to fight effectively in the
information domain. For example, in the global conflict against the
Islamic State, one combatant command implemented a reorganization to
integrate and synchronize lethal and non-lethal effects, notably by aligning
Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) previously located and managed
by leaders in their J2, J3, and J6 offices under a single advocate for
information operations in the operations division (J3). A senior defense
official noted, “We must be organized properly” to be effective at
information operations.23 This example shows that organization was the
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solution to harmonize the effects of multiple strategic communication
tools found in otherwise disjointed and stove-piped IRCs.
The British, Soviet experiences, and the Islamic State example illustrate
that strategic information operations are more successful when an
organization dedicated to information related activities, both offensive and
defensive, is responsible for management and oversight of the operations.
The World War II and Cold War examples show that when centrally
managed, information operations inform and shape specific audience
perceptions in order to gain a competitive advantage. The United States
presently lacks a unified framework to identify, defend, counter, integrate,
and synchronize its available information capabilities for multi domain
operations, and it should consider a new organizational construct to
address these challenges in the future.

Preparing for the Strategic Future
The Joint Staff in the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035 predicted
future activities would include adversaries focused on espousing or
reinforcing information warfare and propaganda efforts with military
action.24 Cyber intelligence consultant Emilio Iasiello cites Russian
strategists who stress information warfare “will be the starting point of
every action now called the new-type of warfare (a hybrid war) in which
broad use will be made of the mass media and, where feasible, the global
computer networks (blogs, various social networks, and other
resources).”25 These future activities will not be limited to state actors,
such as Russia. The U.S. Marine Corps security environment forecast for
2030-2045 envisioned that “information operations and strategic
communication as part of a whole-of-government approach will grow in
importance.”26 Even non-state actors in the future will “wage a
propaganda war on terms far more favorable to them than to conventional
militaries or governments.”27
To prepare for challenges across the continuum of conflict, including
hybrid warfare, DoD must manage and exploit the effects of information
by conducting and defending against strategic information operations. To
be successful, the Joint Force will need to engage in operations through all
domains to capture data and process intelligence to identify malign actors
and understand their intentions in order to counter the use of “ideas,
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images, and violence designed to manipulate the United States and its
allies.”28 Concurrently, it will need to employ information offensively to
support achievement of military objectives.
The military services have begun to adapt their organization frameworks
in an attempt to prioritize information operations, although inconsistently.
For example, the Marine Corps has a new deputy commandant for
information.29 The Air Force created a new information operations career
field, and a dedicated technical training school opened in fiscal year (FY)
2019.30 The Navy stood-up the Naval Information Warfare Development
Center to grow a skilled cadre of information warfare professionals for
battlefronts of the future.31 The Army established a pilot program to
identify where service information operations capabilities should reside,
budgeting $14.7 million for training in FY 2019.32 The inconsistent
application for how to organize for strategic operations in the information
environment reflects how widely debated the topic remains among policy
makers.
A leading organizational proposal under consideration is the creation of a
national information office. In testimony to the Senate Armed Service
committee, The Honorable Michael D. Lumpkin, former Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
(ASD/SOLIC), argued the merits for creating a national information office.
He considered a model for the office advocated for by former Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper, which was the resurrection of the
now defunct United States Information Agency (USIA), although Director
Clapper opined the reestablished USIA would need to be more robust
based on the emerging information landscape.33 While agreeing there
would be benefits with reconstituting the USIA, Lumpkin acknowledged
there were also challenges and other issues that led to its disestablishment.
Instead of the USIA, Lumpkin argued for elevating the U.S. State
Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) to a position similar in
status to the Director of National Intelligence. In doing so, it would align
authority, responsibility, and accountability for information operations
under a single office, and a single information strategy.34
At present, the GEC, charged with “leading the USG’s efforts to counter
propaganda and disinformation from international terrorist organizations
and foreign countries,” has limited resources and capacity.35 According to
74
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss4/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.4.1735

Hatch: The Future of Strategic Information and Cyber-Enabled Information

Thomas Hill, a former House senior staffer, “If people were serious about
combating Russian propaganda, you have to be honest -- $80 million and
50 people in the basement of the State Department [are] not going to cut
it. That is not enough.”36 A January 2018 U.S. Senate report specified, “In
early 2017, Congress provided the State Departments [GEC] the resources
and mandate to address the Kremlin disinformation campaigns, but
operations have been stymied by the Department’s hiring freeze and
unnecessarily long delays by its senior leadership in transferring
authorized funds to the office.”37 In April 2018, a U.S. Combatant
Command senior representative engaged in information operations said
he was unaware of any GEC messaging efforts, pithily stating, “They ain’t
talking to us.”38 Another official familiar with the GEC’s efforts in Europe’s
Black Sea Region described them in terms that were limited in scope to
ensuring that ongoing individual U.S. government efforts were
“complementary.”39 Consequently, the GEC may not be a suitable option
to oversee strategic information operations without significant additional
investments. Therefore, assigning the lead for strategic information and
cyber-enabled information operations within the DoD may be a more
attractive alternative.
The 2018 NDAA might enable such an alternative. This act directs the
Secretary of Defense to designate a senior official responsible for multidomain strategic information operations. Further, it directs the creation of
a “cross-functional task force to integrate DoD organizations responsible
for information operations, military deception, public affairs, electronic
warfare, and cyber operations.”40 According to Dr. Christopher Paul, “It
seems self-evident that if we are to avoid information fratricide, we need to
be coordinating all the messages and signals.”41 The office’s primary
responsibility would be to produce strategy, conduct planning, and
champion a budget meant to “counter, deter, and conduct strategic
information operations and cyber-enabled information operations.”42 The
office would be responsible for determining what information to
disseminate to a given audience, and what information to protect from
disclosure. Establishing the office would clarify roles and responsibilities,
and reduce bureaucracy by implementing an integrated structure for
offensive and defensive information operations that can move at the speed
of our adversaries.
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There are two cogent options under the current defense structure to
consider for implementation of the NDAA direction. The first is to align
information responsibilities to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)). Information operations, however, are military
operations and require intelligence support, but they are not directly
intelligence operations. While OUSD(I) could assume a greater role, it
does not appear to be the most appropriate office for information
operations. Alternatively, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (USD(P)) could assume these new responsibilities. On face value,
this would be a logical placement as current policy assigns responsibility to
the OUSD(P) for oversight of information operations in the DoD, and
USD(P) acts as the principal staff advisor to the Secretary of Defense for
information.43 History suggests, however, there are disadvantages to a
more robust OUSD(P) role.
A previous attempt to align strategic information operations under
OUSD(P) ended with great controversy.44 In 2001, OSD created the Office
of Strategic Influence and it reported directly to the USD(P).45 Although
originally focused on defense issues linked to constructing strategy and
objectives targeting specific audiences, OSD envisioned the Office would
eventually become an established interagency organization with the
charter to conduct strategic influence campaigns. However, someone with
knowledge of the office and its mission leaked information to the media
suggesting the Office would seed foreign media with misinformation and
false messages. Public uproar ensued, and as a result, then Secretary
Rumsfeld closed the office.
The controversy could recur if there was a repeat of the initiative. In her
2003 Army War College article, LTC Susan Gough interviewed a senior
official with knowledge of OUSD(P) inner dynamics.46 She quotes the
senior official as stating there remained fears that “whoever sabotaged [the
Office of Strategic Influence]” will sabotage future efforts as well.47
Although this incident occurred in 2001, senior leaders would need to
evaluate the risk of a greater OUSD(P) role for information operations.
Ultimately, revisiting the approach of reassigning strategic information
operations to OUSD(P) may have a similar outcome as experienced in
2001.
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Additionally, there are challenges with the current construct of aligning
information operations under either OUSD(I) or OUSD(P) during a crisis.
According to LTG P.K. Keen, a key observation from Joint Task Force
(JTF)-Haiti was the need to communicate with a multitude of audiences in
one voice.48 To assist in this effort, the JTF established a Joint Information
and Interagency Center (JIIC), an organizational construct LTG Keen
recommended be codified for future JTFs. Within the JIIC, there would be
a team dedicated to social media, blogs, websites, and other resources,
such as public affairs media professionals, ready to advance the strategic
narrative and counter any misinformation through cyber-enabled
information operations. Further, the center would serve as a centralized
information coordination and synchronization hub for all messaging and
information sharing from the tactical to strategic levels.49
More senior defense leaders believe that centralized organization matters
for how to conduct information operations in the future and are making
changes. The Secretary of Defense assigned the U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) as the Joint Proponent for Military Information
Support Operations (MISO), and directed USSOCOM to establish a
centralized DoD MISO Global Messaging/Counter Messaging capability,
with $1.8 million allocated in FY 2019 for the initiative.50 Further, LTG
Stephen Fogarty, U.S. Army Cyber Commander, said the Army is moving
towards merging its cyber and electronic warfare functional areas. LTG
Fogarty believes, “It’s time to think seriously about absorbing other
historically-distinct mission areas – or tribes – including information
operations.”51
Another option available consistent with LTG Fogarty’s August 2019
announcement to absorb information operations into U.S. Army Cyber
Command, and change its name to the Army Information Warfare
Command, is the potential for U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to
assume responsibility as global synchronizer for United States strategic
information operations and cyber-enabled information options.52
Moreover, USCYBERCOM could restructure into an Information Warfare
Command similar to the Army model. USCYBERCOM hosted a panel that
considered this option. An October 2018 USCYBERCOM Cyber Strategy
Symposium highlighted the ongoing challenges experienced by the current
practice of subdividing information operations and cyberspace
capabilities, however, the proposed solutions focused on what
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USCYBERCOM could do to augment the nation’s ability to conduct
strategic influence operations rather than moving to oversee these
operations.53 While USCYBERCOM is postured to deliver operationalized
information or defend against an adversary’s information attacks in
cyberspace, the multi domain nature of the mission and associated
requirements for the information enterprise appear to align more with
NDAA direction to assign these responsibilities to a senior official at the
undersecretary of defense level.

Recommendations to Organize for Strategic Information
Operations
An organizational construct led by an Under Secretary of Defense for
Information Operations (USD(IO)) would posture the United States for
dominance in the information environment. The new undersecretary,
consistent with NDAA 2018 direction, would be responsible for oversight
of strategic information policy and guidance.54 Further, the USD(IO)
would hold responsibility for resource management leading to
Department-wide integration of information operations and cyber-enabled
operations. It would also create a strategic framework and guidance for
cross-functional information and cyber-enabled operations. Additionally,
it would be responsible for a common operating paradigm and guidance to
counter adversary propaganda, influence, and deception activities
targeting the United States.55 It would take appropriate action to maintain
the integrity of elections, and prevent a foreign power from adversely
influencing the outcome of an initiative such as Brexit. The following
diagram outlines the notional alignment of IRCs under the USD(IO).
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Figure 1. Notional Alignment of IRCs under a proposed USD(IO).

Legend:
USD(IO)
Operations
MISO
MILDEC
OPSEC
Source: Author.

Proposed Under Secretary of Defense for Information
Military Information Support Operations
Military Deception
Operations Security

In addition to the above responsibilities, one particular function the
OUSD(IO) would conduct is a dedicated effort to identify and understand
funding of adversary online propaganda tools. Law enforcement, financial,
counterintelligence and other intelligence capabilities would have
significant roles in mapping the network. As appropriate, this effort would
provide decision makers with information on how an adversary resources
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propaganda generation to support policy decisions on countering
propaganda. According to a foreign senior official familiar with Russian
propaganda efforts in Europe, a capability to identify and counter Russia’s
ability to fund their information operations would serve as the most
critical measure to combat disinformation efforts.56 To prevent the misuse
of authorities, the U.S. Government should create an Inspector General for
Information.
The proposed organizational framework enables a sophisticated
mechanism to generate, coordinate, “deconflict,” and manage the delivery
of strategic United States messaging to achieve national and departmental
informational objectives through the full spectrum of intelligence,
counterintelligence, diplomatic, economic, and other appropriate
capabilities.57 Further, it would better afford the USG the ability to identify
and counter adversary misinformation, deceptions, and propaganda,
linking defensive and offensive capabilities. Additionally, the organization
should include a dedicated staff of trained planners and associated
specialists whom have access to national and defense senior leaders, to
include the National Security Council, in order to shape an information
narrative to advance policy goals consistent with a national information
strategy.
This evolving capability forms the basis for DoD strategic communication.
Dr. Paul describes strategic communication as the “coordinated actions,
messages, images, and other forms of signaling or engagement intended to
inform, influence, or persuade selected audiences in support of national
objectives.”58 Professor Phil Taylor identifies four pillars of strategic
communication, including 1) Information Operations; 2) Psychological
Operations (the official DoD term is MISO); 3) Public Diplomacy; and 4)
Public Affairs.59 Appointing a single advocate responsible for integrating
each of the strategic communication pillars will prove essential in building
out the currently disjointed framework in order to harmonize the effects of
information operations across the continuum of conflict.60
In this light, promoting an office focused on any one single information
related capability, for example one with an emphasis only on MISO or
Public Affairs, would fail to capitalize on the potential advantages afforded
through aligning the multitude of IRCs under a unifying framework. With
an organizational construct to better orchestrate a synchronized
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information campaign, the department will need to develop and
consolidate a robust operational approach, which will enable the
dissemination and facilitation of messaging to reach key networks and
audiences.
A DoD Information Operations Center (DIOC) is required to effectively
integrate and synchronize the elements and organizations that implement
and support information operations. A critical function of a DIOC then
would be the coordination and “deconfliction” of messaging across
organizations, combatant commands, agencies, and departments. The
intent is to harmonize the delivery and effects of messaging, while
avoiding the potential for information fratricide. The Joint Staff National
Military Command Center or the National Counter Terrorism Center may
offer a framework for managing information operations worth
benchmarking.
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Figure 2. Notional Defense Information Operations Center as part of the
OUSD(IO).

Legend:
MISO
MILDEC
OPSEC
J-2
J-2X
J-3
J-4
J-5
J-6
J-7
J-9
SOF
STO
Source: Author.

Military Information Support Operations
Military Deception
Operations Security
Intelligence Directorate
Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence
Operations Staff
Logistics Directorate
Plans Directorate
Communications Systems Directorate
Force Development Directorate
Civil-Military Operations Directorate
Special Operations Forces
Special Technical Operations
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The OUSD(IO) should be designated the centralized authority responsible
for the overall information strategy and nested themes. A centralized
authority ensures that all the IRCs, department heads, and defense
agencies are working towards a common goal, and would therefore
synchronize and integrate the previously uncoordinated initiatives of
stove-piped IRCs. This approach is consistent with the United States
desired end state, where
“through operations, actions, and activities in the information
environment, DoD has the ability to affect the decision-making and
behavior of adversaries and designated others to gain advantage
across the range of military operations.”61
The following matrix assists in understanding how organizing for strategic
and cyber-enabled information operations across all phases and the
continuum of conflict may promote integrating, synchronizing, and
harmonizing civil and military efforts. As such, it can aid representatives
responsible for a specific information related capability with identifying
priorities and measures of effectiveness for each operational phase. The
OUSD(IO) must ensure that strategic and cyber-enabled information
operations are not only coordinated and “deconflicted,” but also
harmonized as the sum of the parts move towards unity of effort. New
cyber tools may be necessary to optimize effectiveness, as well as updated
authorities to use them offensively when appropriate.
Table 1. Information Operations Integrating, Synchronizing,
and Harmonizing Matrix.
Continuum of Conflict
Phases

Shaping/Deter

Objectives

Describe Policy
Goals / Conduct
Operations to
Inform and
Shape JIE

Seize
Initiative

Hostilities

Termination

PostHostility

Stabilization

Obtain
Surprise

Dominate
JIE /
Deliver
themes to
inform and
shape
behaviors

Assessment of
Attitudes

Describe
Current and
Desired
Behaviors

Describe Behavior to
Inform and Shape
Perceptions
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Note: The author adopted this matrix from a tool the Army War College originally
developed in 1992 that William Flavin later updated and referenced to assist in Planning
for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success.
Legend: JIE – Joint Information Environment.
Source: Author.

Summary and Conclusions
This article used an approach similar to Maj Wedemeyer’s 1941
assessment for constructing the World War II victory plan: In order to
know how to organize for operations in the future, one first must know
what missions one will execute. To prepare for future challenges across the
continuum of conflict, the United States must be postured to manage and
exploit the effects of information by conducting and defending against
strategic information operations. Toward this end, the United States will
need to engage in operations through multiple domains to capture data
and process intelligence to identify malign actors and understand their
intentions in order to counter the use of “ideas, images, and violence
designed to manipulate the United States and its allies.” 62 Practitioners
must employ defensive activities concurrently with offensive information
operations to support achievement of national and military objectives. As
the USG currently fields these capabilities among multiple stove-piped
organizations and agencies, it therefore lacks efficiencies normally gained
through combined action, unity of command, and unity of effort. These
efforts include public affairs, political warfare, political advocacy, public
diplomacy, and psychological (MISO) operations.
A solution to remedy these challenges, consistent with 2018 NDAA
congressional direction, is for the DoD to create a new organization and
designate an Under Secretary of Defense for Information Operations
(USD(IO)) responsible for strategic information and cyber-enabled
information operations. The USD(IO)’s responsibilities would include
strategy development and coordination authority for all information
related capabilities. The new organizational framework enables a
sophisticated mechanism to generate, coordinate, “deconflict,” and
manage the delivery of strategic messaging to achieve national and
departmental information objectives through the full spectrum of
intelligence, counterintelligence, diplomatic, economic, and other
appropriate capabilities. Similarly, the organization would be responsible
for countering an adversary’s use of their information capabilities.
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Without an information office responsible for countering Russian or
another adversary’s messaging with truthful, reliable, and credible
information, disinformation or propaganda will trammel the effectiveness
of USG diplomatic efforts abroad, or contribute to a loss of confidence in
the government and its systems.
The creation of an organization responsible for strategic information and
cyber-enabled information operations postures the USG for dominance in
the information environment. Further, a cognizable organizational
framework will enable integration, synchronization, and harmonization of
information and cyber-enabled activities making the joint force more
lethal. It will take time and resources to achieve maturation in how the
United States and DoD organizes for strategic information and cyberenabled information operations. Presidential and Congressional
engagement may prove necessary. There will be risk with an
organizational change that may inadvertently or adversely impact
associated efforts, and adjustments may be required. Ultimately,
operationalizing the USD(IO) organizational construct can overcome these
challenges to unify and focus America’s vast information capabilities to
win engagements fought across multiple domains in the future.

85
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 4

Endnotes
Clint Watts, “Russia and 2016 Elections,” Testimony to U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, March 30, 2017, https://www.c-span.org/video/?426227-1/senateintelligence-panel-warned-russians-play-sides.
2 Pavel Koshkin, “The Paradox of Kremlin Propaganda: How It Tries to Win Hearts and
Minds,” Russia Direct, April 2, 2015, http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/paradoxkremlin-propaganda-how-it-tries-win-hearts-and-minds.
3 Aaron Mehta, “Here’s How Much Global Military Spending Rose in 2018,”
DefenseNews, April 28, 2019, https://www.defensenews.co/global/2019/04/28/hereshow-much-global-military-spending-rose-in-2018.
4 Emilio Iasiello, “Russia’s Improved Information Operations: From Georgia to Crimea,”
Parameters 47, no. 2 (2017): 62, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=803998
5 Patrick Wintour, “Russian Bid to Influence Brexit Vote Detailed in New U.S. Senate
Report,” The Guardian, January 10, 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/10/russian-influence-brexit-votedetailed.
6 Jane’s Defense Industry and Markets Intelligence Center, “Cyber-Enabled Information
Operations: The Battlefield Threat Without a Face,” 2018,
https//www.janes.com/images/assets/438/77438/Cyberenabled_information_operations_The_battlefield_threat_without_a_face.pdf.
7 U.S. Senate Report, “Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russian and Europe:
Implications for US Nations Security,” Committee on Foreign Relations, 115 th Congress,
2nd Session, (U.S. Government Publishing Office Washington: 2018),
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf.
8 Caroline Baylon, “Is the BREXIT Vote Legitimate if Russia Influenced the Outcome?”
Newsweek, December 2, 2016, https://www.newsweek.com/brexit-russia-presidentialelection-donald-trump-hacker-legitimate-527260.
9 Morgan Maier, “A Little Masquerade: Russia’s Evolving Employment of Maskirovka,”
School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff
College, 2016, 4, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1022096.pdf
10 Craig Timberg and Tony Romm, “It’s not just the Russians Anymore as Iranians and
Others Turn Up Disinformation Efforts ahead of 2020 Vote,” The Washington Post, July
25, 2019, https://washingtonpost.com.
11 Oriana Pawlyk, “SecAF Wilson: Mattis' Departure Made it Easier for Me to Resign,”
Military.Com, May 15, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/05/15/secafwilson-mattis-departure-made-it-easier-me-resign.html.
12 USCYBERCOM 2018 Cyberspace Strategy Symposium Proceedings, 1,
https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Cyberspace%20
Strategy%20Symposium%202018.pdf?ver=2018-07-11-092344-427.
13 Bruce McClintock, “Russian Information Warfare: A Reality that Needs a Response,”
US News & World Report, July 21, 2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/07/russianinformation-warfare-a-reality-that-needs-a.html.
14 Charles E. Kirkpatrick, “An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present; Writing the
Victory Plan of 1941,” (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 60-61.
15 The 2016 DoD Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment identifies the
desired end state as, “Through operations, actions, and activities in the Information
Environment, DoD has the ability to affect the decision-making and behavior of
adversaries and designated others to gain advantage across the range of military
operations.” Also, there is no definition of strategic operations in the information
environment in joint or service doctrine, therefore, this article defines the term in a
manner consistent with established DoD strategy.
16 The DoD Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment outlines an approach
of supporting a broad whole of government effort. The strategy specifies, “The
Department has a role to be trained, equipped, and prepared to counter such activities
[misleading or false information as propaganda] in this uneasy, steady-state environment
1

86
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss4/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.4.1735

Hatch: The Future of Strategic Information and Cyber-Enabled Information

traditionally referred to as phase zero. To maintain unity of effort, DoD must closely
coordinate operations, actions, and activities with other United States Government
departments and agencies to facilitate horizontal and vertical continuity of strategic
themes, messages, and actions.” The mission this strategy is to support is not available at
the time of writing, and the creation of a strategy linked to a specific mission would likely
provide necessary input to refine the framework for how the DoD would organize for
strategic information operations and cyber-enabled operations.
17 J.C. Masterman, The Double Cross System: The Incredible True Story of How Nazi
Spies Were Turned into Double Agents (Original work published New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1972), 10-13.
18 Masterman, Double Cross, 15.
19 Marc Fisher, “East Germany Ran Anti-Semitic Campaign in West in ‘60s,” Washington
Post, February 28, 1993,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/02/28/e-germany-ranantisemitic-campaign-in-west-in-60s/418db6f8-fc45-4504-94c095184f8f11a6/?utm_term=.6d7bfe4fb180.
20 John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents, (New York: Reader’s
Digest Press 1974), 174.
21 Barron, KGB, 173.
22 Barron, KGB, 165.
23 Author’s discussion with a senior defense official assigned to a combatant command,
April 23, 2018.
24 Joint Operating Environment (JOE) of 2035, The Joint Force in a Contested and
Disordered World, July 14, 2016, 23.
25 Timothy L. Thomas, “The Evolution of Russian Military Thought: Integrating Hybrid,
New-Generation, and New-Type Thinking,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 4.
(October 2016): 554–575, as cited by Emilio Iasiello, “Russia’s Improved Information
Operations: From Georgia to Crimea,” Parameters 47, no. 2 (2017): 51.
26 The Marine Corps Security Environment Forecast, Futures 2030-2045, 66,
https://www.mcwl.marines.mil/Portals/34/Documents/2015%20MCSEF%20%20Futures%202030-2045.pdf.
27 Marine Corps Security Environment Forecast, 70.
28 JOE of 2035, 42.
29 Todd South, “Deputy Commandant Leans on Intel Community for Future Fight,”
Marine Times Online, September 29, 2017,
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2017/09/29/deputycommandant-leans-on-intel-community-for-future-fight/.
30 Stephen Losey, “Information Operations Officers Get Their Own School,” Air Force
Times Online, March 13, 2018, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-airforce/2018/03/13/information-operations-airmen-get-their-own-school/.
31 Mark Pomerleua, “Here’s How the Navy is Developing Information Warfare Top Guns,”
C4ISRNET, May 29, 2018, https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2018/05/29/hereshow-the-navy-is-developing-information-warfare-top-guns/.
32 Mark Pomerleau, “Here’s How the Army is Spending in Information Operations,”
DefenseNews Online, February 13, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federalbudget/2018/02/13/heres-how-the-army-is-spending-in-information-operations/.
33 Cyber-enabled Information Operations: Hearings before the Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Senate, 115th Cong., (April 27, 2017)
(Testimony of Michael Lumpkin, quoting James Clapper).
34 Another argument is for the creation of a new information organization, the Office of
Strategic Narratives, as a component of the National Security Council. The benefits of a
national information office, similar to advantages afforded in the now debunk USIA, and
without the challenges of a “too peripheral” GEC highlight significant benefits to counter
the status quo. The proposed Under Secretary of Defense for Information Operations
(USD(IO)) framework would dovetail nicely into an executive level information
organization, and could feed specific public diplomacy or public affairs narratives from
the NSC into the Defense Information Operations Center for enhanced integration and

87

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 4

“deconfliction.” Maj Luke Karl, Maj Joseph Lane, and Cmdr David Sanchez, “How to Stop
Losing the Information War,” Defense One, July 26, 2018,
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/how-stop-losing-informationwar/150056/.
35 US Department of State, Global Engagement Center, online description, accessed on
September 13, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/gec/.
36 Abigail Tracy, “A Different Kind of Propaganda: Has American Lost the Information
War?” Vanity Fair, April 23, 2018, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/04/russiapropaganda-america-information-war.
37 US Senate Report, “Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russian and Europe:
Implications for US Nations Security,” Committee on Foreign Relations, 115 th Congress,
2nd Session, (U.S. Government Publishing Office Washington: 2018), 3.
38 Author’s discussion with a senior defense official, April 23, 2018.
39 Discussion between the author and an official familiar with the GEC’s efforts in
Europe’s Black Sea Region during the author’s research on this topic while visiting
Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia in February and March 2018.
40 NDAA 2018, Section 1637.
41 Dr. Christopher Paul, “Strategic Communication Origins, Concepts, and Current
Debates,” (Santa Barbara, CA, 2011), 29.
42 NDAA 2018, Senate Summary, 8,
https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY18%20NDAA%20summary2.
pdf
43 DoDD 3600.01, Information Operations, May 2, 2013, incorporating Change 1, May 4,
2017, 5,
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/360001p.pdf?ver
=2019-08-12-094732-187.
44 Donald Rumsfeld, “War in the Information Age,” Los Angeles Times, February 23,
2006, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-feb-23-oe-rumsfeld23story.html
45 “New Pentagon office to spearhead information war,” CNN.Com, February 20, 2002,
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/02/19/gen.strategic.influence/.
46 LTC Susan L. Gough, “The Evolution of Strategic Influence,” (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
U.S. Army War College, 2003), 31.
47 Gough, Strategic Influence, 31.
48 P.K. Keen, Matthew Elledge, Charles Nolan, Jennifer Kimmey, “Foreign Disaster
Response Joint Task Force-Haiti,” Military Review (November/December 2010), 91,
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/militaryreview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20101231_art015.pdf.
49 Keen, Foreign Disaster Response, 92.
50 Fiscal Year 2019 President’s Budget Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide United
States Special Operations Command, February 2018, Int-874,
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/budget_justi
fication/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/SOCOM_OP5.pdf.
51 Jared Serbu, “Army’s Top Cyber Officer Pushes Other Disciplines, Information
Operations,” Federal News Radio, August 28, 2018, https://federalnewsradio.com/dodreporters-notebook-jared-serbu/2018/08/armys-top-cyber-officer-pushes-otherdisciplines-information-operations/.
52 Sydney Freedberg Jr., “Army to Build New Info War Force – Fast,” August 22, 2019,
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/the-armys-information-warfare-build-up/.
53 USCYBERCOM 2018 Cyberspace Strategy Symposium Proceedings, 9,
https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Cyberspace%20
Strategy%20Symposium%202018.pdf?ver=2018-07-11-092344-427.
54DoDD 3600.01, Information Operations, May 2, 2013, incorporating Change 1, May 4,
2017, 5-6,
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/360001p.pdf?ver
=2019-08-12-094732-187. This directive provides an overview of the responsibilities.

88

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss4/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.4.1735

Hatch: The Future of Strategic Information and Cyber-Enabled Information

Iasiello, “Russia’s Improved Information Operations,” 62-63. Iasiello offered three
recommendations for the U.S. to more effectively address hostile information activities
from its adversaries, 1) Establish a National counter-information center and strategy; 2)
Protect against fake news, and 3) International engagement. The proposed OUSD(IO) is a
solution to implement these recommendations.
56 Interview with author, March 2018.
57 Joint doctrine specifies JFCs and their staffs are responsible for integrating,
synchronizing, employing, and assessing the IRCs used to create effects, accomplish
tasks, or achieve specific objectives intended to influence a target audience’s decisionmaking. It does so within and across the joint functions, while protecting the decision
making of the United States and its allies. To enable desired effects, coordination and
“deconfliction” among information operation subgroups, public affairs, defense support
to public diplomacy and civil affairs is necessary. While Joint doctrine defines the
requirement to integrate and synchronize the various elements of information operations,
however, it does not prescribe to JFCs an organizational structure of have a definition of
the proposed construct as outlined in the NDAA. In effect, the NDAA direction serves as
an enabler to initiate action and move forward in establishing a national capability for
strategic information operations and cyber-enabled information operations. Joint
Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, January 17, 2017, Incorporating Change 1, October 22,
2018,
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-1127-160457-910, IV-1. The joint military community employs the verb ‘deconflict’ in an
official military capacity. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, July
2019), ii. In 2005, the Oxford English Dictionary defined ‘deconflict’ as: To reduce the
risk of collision in (a combat situation, airspace, etc) by separating the flight paths of
one’s own aircraft or airborne weaponry. Matthew Weaver, “Deconflict: Buzzword to
prevent risk of a US-Russian Clash over Syria,” The Guardian, October 1, 2015,
https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/oct/01/deconflict-buzzword-to-prevent-the-risk-of-a-us-russian-clash-oversyria.
58 Paul, Strategic Communication, 3.
59 Philip M. Taylor, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications,” in Introduction,
Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, eds., (New
York: Routledge, 2009), 14.
60 There is a senior leader vision to adapt the Joint approach to the information
environment. Gen Martin E. Dempsey, Joint Information Environment White Paper,
January 22, 2013,
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/environmentalwhitepaper.p
df.
61 Department of Defense, DoD Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment,
(Washington DC: 2016), 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoDStrategy-for-Operations-in-the-IE-Signed-20160613.pdf.
62 JOE of 2035, 42.
55

89
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019

